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ARCHITECTURE 
AND THE BEHOLDER'S EYE 
B.R. TILGHMAN 
"Beauty is in the eye of the beholder." Like so many shibboleths 
so easily lisped, no one seems to have a very clear idea just what it 
means or what its espousal commits us to. There are at least two ways 
this slogan can be understood. It may be no more than a reminder 
that in discussions of artistic and aesthetic matters that we must ex-
pect a good deal of disagreement and that such disagreements can't 
be settled by anything like a scientific test. But this is something that 
we all know and is not really very interesting. There is, however, 
another way to understand the expression that is important and 
should be talked about. 
The strongest claim that can be gotten out of our platitude is 
that every aesthetic and artistic description and judgment of value is 
arbitrary and that anyone can say anything he pleases about a work 
of art without every having to justify what he says or fear that he may 
be mistaken. This view of our relation to art has certain attractions. 
It offers a convenient reason for dismissing the critics in the local 
paper with whom I disagree and for objecting to the lastest proposal 
of the City Commission for civic improvement. It appeals to the eter-
nal democrat in me by giving theoretical support to my desire to be in 
matters aesthetic as good a man as my betters. The view, however, is 
false and, in addition to being false, it is pernicious. It is pernicious 
because it destroys the possibility of any kind of rational discussion of 
a very important aspect of our lives and our cultural traditions. It is 
pernicious because it destroys the point of art training and art 
education: the student can be as good as his master without the ar-
dors of the life drawing class. I shall suggest why it is false. 
Perhaps the clearest expression of the "eye of the beholder" 
thesis was presented by that enfant terrible of eighteenth century 
British philosophy, David Hume. In an essay entitled "Of the Stan-
dard of Taste" Hume sketched a theory, "a species of philosophy, 
which cuts off all hopes of success" in the attempt to establish a stan-
dard of artistic evaluation. According to this theory "Beauty is no 
quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which con-
templates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty." Hume 
explained all this by drawing a distinction, in his eighteenth century 
terminology, between judgment and sentiment. A judgment is a 
statement that describes things in ·the world and their characteristics. 
Judgments are either true or false. A sentiment is merely a feeling 
that arises in a person as a reaction to things in the world. Sentiments 
are neither true nor false. To say that "beauty is no quality in things 
themselves" is simply to say that our artistic descriptions and 
evaluations are not "judgments," that is, are not statements about 
things whose truth or falsity can be determined. Such utterances are, 
instead, the expression of "sentiments," that is, expressions of our 
feelings, our likes and dislikes. Thus to say that a building is 
beautiful is not to make a statement about the building whose truth 
can be tested, but is more like shouting "Hurrah!" in the presence of 
the building. (Hume thought he could incorporate this "species of 
philosophy" into a theory that would establish an objective basis for 
aesthetic evaluation, but all that and why he failed is another story.) 
Hume's account misleadingly suggests that the word "beauty" is 
just about the only word that plays a role in aesthetic discussion. In 
fact, there is scarcely a word in our language that can't at sometime 
or another be pressed into doing aesthetic service. To suppose that 
every such word is an expression of a feeling is already to put a strain 
on the theory. It doesn't take into account the many different kinds of 
things we say. 
A work of architecture, like any work of art, can have an 
aesthetic character and. this character can differ radically from one 
building to another. Consider, for example, the spatial character of 
the Roman basilica, an architectural form used in early Christian 
churches, several of which still survive. A basilica consists of a long 
rectangular nave flanked by narrow side aisles often separated from 
the nave by an arcade of columns. The aisles were usually dark, 
drawing their light from the clerestory of the nave, and consequently 
did not compete for attention with the space of the nave. The arcade 
of columns served as a decorative addition to the nave and the rhythm 
of their spacing helped to emphasize the horizontal movement of the 
main space. 
The spatial character of the later gothic church and the relations 
between the side aisles and the principal space of the nave is quite dif-
ferent from that of the basilica. (Fig. 1, 2.) The side aisles become 
much more important in their own right. They have their own win-
dows and are sufficiently lit so that their own structure can be seen. 
The proportions of the aisles are generally different from those of the 
nave; their scale is smaller, more intimate and more human that the 
soaring nave whose vault can be almost lost to sight. The proportions 
an!f scale of the gothic aisle provideS_:, a contrast with the space of the 
nave rather than merely outlining it as did the basillican aisle. 
Descriptions and comparisons such as these are clearly not ex-
pressions of our "feelings" about the spaces, but are reports of what 
is there to be seen. At this point, however, someone may be puzzled. 
. "Of course," he may query, "the nave and the side aisles are there to 
be seen, but is the contrast between them or the emphasis one gives to 
the other there to be seen?" One may indeed be pardoned for won-
dering whether contrasts and emphases are objects of sight to be 
placed alongside columns, vaultings, and windows. 
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(Fig. I) PlanofOldSt. Peter's, Rome. Begun c. 333A.D. 
(Fzg. 2) Durham Cathedral. Plan and Transverse Section. 1093-1130 
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vestigation into the very idea of seeing. Seeing turns out to be a 
much more complex notion that we tend to think. The complexity of 
the notion was first pointed out by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig 
Wittgenstein in his book, Philosophical Investigations, first 
published in 1953. Wittgenstein introduces us to some of those com-
plexities by means of the figure which can be seen either as a duck or 
as a rabbit. (Fig. 3.) By means of this example we are reminded that 
in addition to the experience of seeing an object, there is also the ex-
perience of seeing it as this or that. This latter kind of seeing is not 
arbitrary; we cannot see things in just any way we please. There is, of 
course, more than one way to see the figure , but there are limitations. 
It can't be seen as a kangaroo. This idea of seeing-·as, I believe, is 
very important for aesthetics and our understanding of art. 
Our description ofthe basilican aisle emphasizing the movement 
of the nave is based upon how we see the interior space rather than 
upon any feelings or sentiments we may have. This, I suggest, is an 
aesthetic instance of seeing-as; we see the aisle as emphasizing the 
horizontal character of the nave. If I am right about this, then one of 
the most important tasks of both architectural education and ar-
chitectural criticism is to teach people what to look for in works of ar-
chitecture and how to see what there is to be seen. Architectural 
beauties are not in the eye of the beholder, but are there for the 
beholder's eye to see. 
I shall close by begging the reader's pardon for presenting an 
over-simplified-and very likely misleading-account of what is 
really a frighteningly tangled business. I have not, for example, said 
anything about why empirical psychology is not really relevant to the 
problems of aesthetics. The attempt to understand the nature of 
visual perception is one of the most difficult, and at the same time ex-
citing, projects in contemporary philosphical aesthetics. 
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(Fig. 3) The Duck-Rabbit Illusion, depending on how one cares to 
interpret the figure. 
